Historical Committee

Book Review by J. Robert Charles

The Missing PeaceThe Missing Peace: The Search for Nonviolent Alternatives in United States History. By James C. Juhnke and Carol M. Hunter. Kitchener, Ont., and Scottdale, Pa.: Pandora Press and Herald Press. 2001. 321 pp. $26.50 (US); $37.50 (Can.).

If the sweep of United States history surveyed in this timely, provocative book fails to persuade you that our nation is in thrall, both domestically and abroad, to the "myth of redemptive violence," then consider for a moment the war carried out earlier this year by the United States (and Britain) in Iraq.

The military campaign against the regime of Saddam Hussein was waged in the face of significant public opposition in polls and in the streets, both at home and overseas. It was waged despite opposition from other governments in the United Nations Security Council. It was waged despite numerous pleas to give weapons inspections more time. In the end, the Bush chose to declare that time had expired for diplomatic solutions short of war. Had it ever believed in non-military alternatives in the first place? Not likely. Under the banner of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the American military juggernaut was unleashed. In short order it toppled one of the three "axis of evil" regimes identified by President Bush a year earlier.

While the story does not stop here, of course, the telling of this most recent episode can. Now, substitute different dates, geographical references, enemies, and names of our political leaders, and leave out any persons who questioned or rejected violence as a means to secure freedom or settle international disputes. You will have the history of the United States as it has been recorded and celebrated from colonial times to the present. This is the contention of James Juhnke and Carol Hunter, historians from Christian liberal arts colleges affiliated with historic peace churches: Juhnke of Bethel (Kans.) College; and Hunter of Earlham College in Indiana.

Now, to be sure, Juhnke and Hunter are not the only historians to point out this close connection between the U.S. history and the glorified use of violence. Writing earlier this year in The Washington Post, Michael Sherry noted that, although Americans like to think their nation is "a reluctant warrior," when "measured by actions, the U.S. is a warrior nation." While not loving war "in some bloodthirsty way," Sherry finds most Americans "focus on the good, or at least the heroism, that war yields," while pushing war's death and destruction into the background. As a nation we see war as a crucible for character and principle. We declare war on cancer, poverty, drug abuse, and AIDS; deep disagreements over issues like abortion, homosexuality, and gender roles become "culture wars." And then there are the real international conflicts: at least ten in the last century. Why do Americans-in marked contrast to continental Europeans, for example-see war as a force for good? Perhaps, according to Sherry, because most recent ones have been fought so far away.

Juhnke and Hunter, however, want to do more than observe, analyze, and gently chide. If war is the locomotive of history, as Trotsky once claimed, in The Missing Peace they clearly hope to derail the engine and rip up the track. Or, failing that, Juhnke and Hunter at least intend to give a voice to courageous persons who have dissented from, and called for alternatives to, this master narrative and public policy template. Their goal is to survey the course of American history from the viewpoint of "peace values" as well as from a global, non-nationalistic perspective.

The authors have borrowed their key interpretive concept from biblical scholar Walter Wink: the "myth of redemptive violence," which sees in violence the most effective way to secure American (or any other nation's) freedom, and which is embedded in a larger "domination system" going back to Babylonian creation myths. In opposition to this perspective, Juhnke and Hunter aim to celebrate "what makes for a peaceful and just society for all the citizens of the world." They take up their task guided by three convictions. First, "violence in the United States has done more harm than good, often escalating rather than diminishing violence"; in other words, they reject violence on strictly utilitarian grounds. Second, history must be viewed through a lens of "mutuality and interdependence rather than of self-willed triumph"; this means that there is no room for a national-interest perspective in interpreting history. Third, "by remembering those people and events who worked for nonviolent alternatives, but whose stories are often missing from traditional texts," their study will "provide hope and encouragement for a less violent future."

In addition to bringing neglected voices such as Native American peacemaking traditions and republican peace experiments of the early nineteenth century into their story, Juhnke and Hunter read American history with "what if?" questions in mind. This approach, also known as "counter-factual" or "conditional" history, rejects the notion that history is limited to the study of what did happen; the road not taken, this approach contends, belongs on the historical map as well. If other policies had been followed, or if those who were working for peace and justice in this situation-Juhnke and Hunter seem quite confident that they can identify them-had been heeded, might war have been avoided, while still producing more or less the same outcomes? Interestingly, Juhnke and Hunter seem not so much in disagreement with the political ends that were pursued-perhaps with the exception of maintaining the unity of the American republic in the mid-nineteenth century-as they are with the means used to pursue them. These violent means, they argue, succeeded only in undermining rather than achieving the goals for which Americans strived.

So, the question that Juhnke and Hunter want to wrestle with is not why American history has taken a consistently violent course; for them the myth of redemptive violence clearly is the chief, maybe only, culprit. Rather, they want to ask, did it really have to happen this way? Was, for example, a war really necessary to win American independence from Britain? Was a war really necessary to abolish slavery in the United States? Was World War I really the great progressive crusade to make the world safe for democracy that President Wilson portrayed it as? Was World War II really the "good war" it is usually remembered to be? Did the Cold War really need to descend into a costly and fear-ridden military competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union? Not surprisingly, given their basic conviction that violence never works and their rather uncritical appeal to all manner of peace advocates all along the way, their answer to each one of these questions is negative. Things could have gone otherwise, they maintain, for reasons that they explain at length and which all but the most hard-core historical determinist will find plausible.

To another set of questions Juhnke and Hunter bring either positive or "maybe" answers. For example, would it have been better if the southern states had been allowed to secede in peace, as some northerners were arguing in 1860? Did the Civil War profoundly corrupt postwar relationships between the races and between regions? Could the United States have retreated to its own hemisphere around 1940, protected by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and left Germany to dominate Europe and Japan East Asia? Did the nonviolent civil rights movement led by Martin Luther King, Jr., challenge the country to live up to its ideals of freedom, democracy, and equality? Do some formulations of gender tend toward greater peace and justice, while others usually lead to violence and justice? Again they advance thoughtful arguments worthy of consideration and show that no historical issue is an open-and-shut case.

The Missing Peace thus succeeds quite admirably in bringing the "what if" questions to the study of American history-even if it does not always explore the likely consequences of these alternatives as thoroughly as one might wish. For this reason alone this book is well worth reading and pondering.

Does it, however, attain its goal of providing hope and encouragement for a less violent future, of helping its readers overcome cynicism and disillusion about an America addicted to the myth of redemptive violence? Here I am less sure-even if the recent war against Iraq had been averted by advocates of nonviolent policies such as the ones studied in these pages. Such a lofty goal is, I think, beyond the ability of any study of political and social history-religious history may be different-to achieve fully. Its results will often vex and weary, even if occasional flickers of hope and encouragement appear, as they do here. Yet peace proponents never seem to gain the upper hand, or maintain it for very long. Why is this? Is it that they are never given a serious hearing and thus never enter the public record? Or do they simply fail to make a persuasive practical case, to enough of their contemporaries to influence the course of national policy, that violence always does more harm than good, and thus are marginalized?

That the authors do not entirely succeed is not entirely surprising given their understanding of peace as "both personal and communal; local and universal; spiritual and political" (p. 13). This broad, idealistic definition not only is devoid of any Christian reference, but also is unlikely, under the conditions of sin-tainted human history, to be realized. No wonder such a peace is a missing peace! To explain its absence in American (or any other) history by the power of a single myth seems a little too neat and simple. Single-cause explanations such as this underestimate what it would take to tidy up the messiness and violence of history short of the eschaton. They also pay insufficient attention to the anarchic, competitive nature of the international context in which no single state-including the United States-can either take its own survival for granted or create the conditions of enduring world peace.

Is then the partial success of The Missing Peace a reason to despair? Once again, I think not. Historically the Mennonite commitment to peace has been Christ-centered; it has not been grounded in claims that violence never works, or that the world of nations can run without it, or that nonviolence will sort everything out if only its advocates are heeded. Rather, it has always been rooted, first, in the conviction that it is wrong for disciples of Christ to engage in violence because it runs counter to his teaching and example, and, second, in the power of his resurrection, which promises ultimate vindication though no immediate success to those who would follow him.

It is only if and when this basis for our peace-and our hope-comes up missing that our real scandal will begin. Until then, the missing peace of this world will sadden us, but will neither surprise nor discourage us.

J. Robert Charles, Goshen, Ind. is director for Europe and project manager for research and program review at Mennonite Mission Network.

 


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